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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS: AN
ESSAY ON PATIENT INTERESTS, THE
CONTINGENCY FEE SYSTEM, JURIES,
AND SOCIAL POLICY
Neil Vidmar*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay is intended to provide laypersons a selected
perspective on one of the most contentious subjects in American civil
law, namely lawsuits against doctors and hospitals involving claims
of medical negligence. It is written at a time when the American
Medical Association and other doctors' organizations, businesses
groups such as the American Chamber of Commerce, politicians, and
mass media have declared a lawsuit crisis.' Those groups are calling
for "tort reform" to cure or at least ameliorate the crisis.
The subject is highly contentious and complicated.3 Among
* Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology,
Duke Law School. This article was supported, in part, by a grant from the
Provost's Common Fund of Duke University. The opinions expressed in the
article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect any position
of Duke University. I am grateful to Donald Beskind and Joanne Ernteman, Dr.
Daniel Hoffman, and Herbert Kritzer for comments on earlier drafts of the
article.
1. See, e.g., Politically Active Physicians Association, at http://
www.fightingdocs.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2005); Ceci Connolly, Cheney
Urges Caps on Malpractice Awards, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at
A6; Rich Lowry, Suing the OB-GYNs: Our Legal System Doesn't Exactly
Welcome Life Into the World, at http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/
lowry200408201007.asp (Aug. 20, 2004).
2. See supra note 1.
3. David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED.
283 (2004), provide an excellent review of the history of contemporary
problems of medical liability insurance. See also NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT
JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS
(1995).
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other topics it involves issues about compensation of patients, about
the ability of the American tort system to separate meritorious claims
from non-meritorious claims, about the degree to which the threat of
lawsuits deters negligent medical errors or causes doctors to engage
in defensive medicine, and about the effects of lawsuits on liability
insurance premiums and ultimately the access Americans have to
health care.
4
This Essay is limited in its scope and presents only one part of
this complicated social and economic problem, so it is essential to
make one thing clear. This Essay does not take issue with the claim
of the American Medical Association and other parties urging "tort
reform " that, beginning about the year 2000, some physicians began
experiencing severe difficulties in obtaining affordable medical
liability insurance.5 The public debate involves the cause of the
problem.
Proponents of tort reform, particularly health care providers and
business organizations, blame the tort system as the principal
culprit. 6 They say that both the frequency of claims and average
amounts of medical negligence claims payments increased over the
years7 and that juries tend to favor plaintiffs and give excessive
verdict awards. 8 They also believe that the "shadow effect" from
large jury awards inflates the size of settlements because the risk of
being subjected to excessive awards forces insurers to settle cases
that may otherwise be defensible.9 Finally, they believe that the
contingency fee system provides a "lottery" effect that contributes to
4. See Studdert et al., supra note 3; Michelle M. Mello et al., The New
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2281 (2003); Peter
Akmajian, A Fair and Balanced Look at Tort Reform, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov.
2004, at 33.
5. See Studdert et al., supra note 3; Press Release, American Medical
Association, Wyoming Becomes 19th State in Medical Liability Crisis
(Oct. 6, 2003) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter
American Medical Association]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE, GAO-03-836 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 15, 2003, at 43, 46-48; Lowry, supra note 1; see also VIDMAR, supra
note 3 (describing similar claims made a decade earlier).
7. Studdert et al., supra note 3.
8. Taylor & Thomas, supra note 6, at 51.
9. Id. at 48.
1218
Spring 2005] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS
the filing of frivolous lawsuits since some insurers may settle suits
for an amount less than the costs of mounting a defense.' In the
process plaintiff lawyers, they say, earn unjustified fees."
Consumer organizations and plaintiff trial lawyers claim that the
problem is not with the tort system. 12 Instead, they say the problem
has several sources. First, there is a high incidence of negligent
medical mistakes that lead to legitimate claims.' 3  Many claims
involve serious injuries, and patients suffer large medical and income
losses.'4  They also contest the assertions that claim frequency is
increasing and that the awards to plaintiffs are inappropriate. 15 They
contend that the real cause of rising malpractice premiums has
several sources. 16 During the 1990s, they say, the liability insurance
companies underpriced the premiums they charged doctors as they
competed with one another for business.' 7 The companies then used
poor investment strategies.' 8 The problems were exacerbated when
there was a downturn in the bond market where insurers invested
their reserves. These groups predict that the problems are
temporary-a downturn in the business cycle that will shortly correct
itself as it did in previous liability insurance crises in the 1970s and
1980s.
21
10. See generally Joseph T. Hallinan, In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely
Have the Last Word, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (discussing how
plaintiffs settle with insurance companies on a predetermined amount to
"protect one person from getting a run-away verdict and.., the other from
getting nothing").
11. Taylor & Thomas, supra note 6, at 45.
12. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, THE EIGHT BIGGEST MYTHS ABOUT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-AND How TO RESPOND (2003), available at
http://centerjd.org.
13. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, A SHORT GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE "CRISIS" 14,
at http://www.centerjd.org/MediaGuide.pdf (Sept. 25, 2002).
14. INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM (Linda Kohn et al. eds., 2000), http://books.nap.edu/catalog/
9728.html?onpi-newsdocl 12999; Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine
Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 95
(2000).
15. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 12.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.
19. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note 12.
20. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 7.
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This Essay draws attention to the fact that the public debate
about medical malpractice tort reform largely ignores the problems
of patients injured through medical negligence. This Essay explains
the processes by which those patients seek compensation through
lawyers and the contingency fee system. Also, the Essay confronts
widely held beliefs about irresponsible juries, frivolous lawsuits, and
greedy or vindictive patients. Attention is drawn to the fact that the
burden of negligently injured patients often falls upon American
taxpayers through their funding of Medicare, Medicaid, and other
welfare agencies. This latter insight raises an undiscussed public
policy issue in the tort reform debate, namely whether taxpayers or
the negligent health care provider should bear the burden of medical
malpractice.
By describing the origin and process of medical malpractice
litigation and by confronting some widely accepted notions about the
litigation system lay readers will hopefully gain a better
understanding of a largely neglected side of the medical malpractice
debate. Yet, they need to keep in mind that there are two sides to the
debate about medical malpractice, that researchers' knowledge bases
are incomplete, and that the inability of health care providers to
obtain affordable professional liability insurance can have major
societal consequences. In the concluding section the Essay briefly
addresses some of the additional issues.
II. THE INCIDENCE AND COSTS OF MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
Sometimes explicitly, but more often tacitly, debates about
medical malpractice contain the arguments that medical negligence is
relatively infrequent 21 and that injuries and the consequent financial
losses of patients are exaggerated.22
A. Medical Injury Due to Negligence Is Not Infrequent
A Harvard study of medical negligence examined hospital
records of 31,000 patients and concluded that one out of every 100
patients admitted to hospital had an actionable legal claim based on
21. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION
124-29 (1993) (reporting that doctors tend to admit that injuries occur but are
reluctant to ascribe the result to negligence).
22. Taylor & Thomas, supra note 6, at 45.
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medical negligence. 23 Some of these patients' injuries were minor or
transient, but fourteen percent of the time the adverse event resulted
in death and ten percent of the time the incident resulted in
hospitalization for more than six months. 24 Furthermore, seven of
those ten persons suffered a permanent disability.25 Generally, the
more serious the injury the more likely it was caused by
negligence.2 6  Subsequent research involving Utah and Colorado
found rates of negligent adverse events that were similar to the New
York findings.2 7 These findings are consistent with earlier research
reported by Patricia Danzon who estimated that on average one in
twenty hospital patients incurred an injury due to medical error.28 A
still earlier study in California estimated that compensable injuries
due to negligence occurred in one in 125 hospitalizations.29 In 2000,
The Institute of Medicine produced a report that relied on these
studies and other data.30 It concluded that each year 98,000 persons
die due to medical negligence and that many other patients sustain
serious injuries.
3 1
There are reasons to believe that the Harvard study may have
underestimated the incidence of medical negligence. That is, the
Harvard data were based on hospital records. Lori Andrews
conducted a study in a large Chicago area hospital, and studied actual
incidence of negligent events in hospital wards. 32 Andrews
discovered that many injuries were not recorded on the records as
required, especially when the main person responsible for the error
was a senior physician.33  Other research is consistent with the
23. WEILER ET AL., supra note 21, at 124-29.
24. Id. at 44.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 44, tbl.3.2.
27. Eric J. Thomas et al., Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and
Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 261, 261 (2000).
28. PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1985).
29. CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL INSURANCE
FEASIBILITY STUDY (Donald Mills ed., 1977).
30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 14; Leape, supra note 14.
31. Id.
32. LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL ERROR AND PATIENT CLAIMING IN A
HOSPITAL SETTING (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9316, 1993); Lori
Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law
and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 357 (2005).
33. Id.
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Andrews findings.34 For example, in one study Dr. Thomas Julian
had a panel of obstetricians review obstetric malpractice claims.
35
He concluded that "common obstetrical risks were often not
recognized or not recorded in medical records."
36
In 2004, Healthgrades, Inc., a company that rates hospitals on
health care for insurance companies and health plans, studied
Medicare records in all fifty states for the years 2000 to 2002.3 7
Healthgrades concluded that the Institute of Medicine's figure of
98,000 deaths was too low and that a better estimate was 195,000
annual deaths. 38  In addition, it estimated that there were 1.14
million "patient safety incidents" among thirty-seven million
hospitalizations. 39 Healthgrades further concluded that "[o]f the total
323,993 deaths among Medicare patients in those years who
developed one or more patient-safety incidents, 263,864, or 81
percent, of these deaths were directly attributable to the incidents"
and that "[o]ne in every four Medicare patients who were
hospitalized from 2000 to 2002 and experienced a patient-safety
incident died."40
There are criticisms that the estimates from these various studies
are too high.4 1 There is no serious question, however, that medical
negligence not only occurs, but that it occurs at a substantial rate.
34. See Leape, supra note 14, at 97 (citing R.W. DuBois and R. Brook,
Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often and Wy? 109 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
582 (1988); Kathryn B. Kirkland et al., The Impact of Surgical-Site Infections
in the 1990s: Attributable Mortality, Excess Length of Hospitalization, and
Extra Costs, 20 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 725 (1999).
35. Thomas M. Julian et al., Investigation of Obstetric Malpractice Closed
Claims: Profile of Event, 2 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 320 (1985).
36. Id.
37. Reuters News, Report Says 195,000 Deaths Due to Hospital Error (July
27, 2004), WL 7/27/04 Reuters Eng. News Serv. 22:23:11.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. For criticism of the Harvard study or controversy over some of the
findings, see Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital
Deaths Due to Medical Errors, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 415 (2001); Clement J.
McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Error Are Exaggerated in Institute of
Medicine Report, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 93 (2000).
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B. Injuries Due to Medical Negligence Have High Costs
One only needs to consider an illustration or two in order to
appreciate the cost of a serious injury.42 For example, a woman in
her forties, divorced, with two dependent children, entered a hospital
with a high fever. A tube was improperly inserted into her lung,
necessitating partial removal of the lung. In the recovery room,
bleeding from the surgery was discovered, and she was rushed back
to the operating room where another tube was improperly inserted in
her other lung. The woman became paralyzed from the chest down
and will have to spend the rest of her life in a nursing home. What
will be the cost of her medical care and lost income for the next three
or more decades? As a second example, what is the cost associated
with a child born blind, deaf, and retarded, and requiring constant
attention to avoid bed sores and other illnesses, especially when
experts predict that she could live for decades?
More than a dozen years ago Frank Sloan and Stephen van Wert,
two economists, conducted systematic assessments of economic
losses (medical costs, income losses, and other expenses) in Florida
cases involving claims of medical negligence occurring as a result of
birth-related incidents. 43 Even though those researchers offered the
caution that their assessment procedures probably underestimated
losses, 44 severely injured children's economic losses were, on
average, between $1.4 and $1.6 million in 1989 dollars.45 If adjusted
for inflation using the consumer price index, these figures in 2004
dollars translate roughly to $2.25 million.46 In the same study the
42. Both of the examples that follow are based on cases from the data set
analyzed in VIDMAR, supra note 3.
43. Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost of Injuries, in FRANK A.
SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 123, 139-40 (1993).
44. Id. at 145.
45. Id. at 138.
46. See Robert C. Sahr, Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors
1800 to Estimated 2014 to Convert Dollars of 2001, Oregon State University,
at http://www.orst.edu/Dept/pol sci/fac/sahr/cv2001.pdf (Mar. 1, 2004).
However, inflation in medical costs is generally higher than the consumer price
index. See http://www.halfhill.com/inflation.html; U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Medical Care Inflation Continues to Rise, MONTHLY LABOR REV., at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2001/May/wk4/art01.htm (May, 29, 2001)
(documenting the increase in the Consumer Price Index for medical care from
1991-2000). Thus, conversion by the CPI underestimates economic losses by
1223
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losses of persons who survived an emergency room incident were
estimated at $1.3 million,47 or $ 2.1 million in 2004 dollars. For
persons who died in an emergency room incident the loss to their
survivors was estimated at $0.5 million,48 or $0.8 million in today's
dollars. It is important to note that there was considerable variability
in these estimated averages: some patients had much higher
economic losses and, conversely, others had lesser economic
losses.
49
Sloan and van Wert cautioned that a major share of past losses
was covered by collateral sources, such as private health insurance,
or taxpayer-supported sources such as Medicare. 50  Even if future
medical expenses, including nursing care, are covered by these other
sources, loss of income and other expenses-such as care given by
family members resulting in diminished income from those family
members-will not be covered. 51 Sloan and van Wert's estimates,
moreover, did not consider non-economic losses, such as pain and
suffering, disfigurement, or loss of enjoyment of life's amenities. 52
C. Non-Economic Losses (i.e., "Pain and Suffering ") as a
Component ofAwards
There are some injuries that are very harmful to the patient but
defy ordinary economic accounting. At a recent congressional
hearing 53  Heather Lewinski, a seventeen-year-old teenager,
courageously testified about her psychological pain as a result of
egregious medical malpractice when she was eight years old that left
her face permanently and horribly disfigured. Among other side-
effects, she constantly drools. She described how other children
made fun of her as she advanced through her teenage years. She had
one self-initiated date, and it was a disaster. She told about her belief
that she will never marry, will never have children, and will have to
some unknown degree.
47. Sloan & van Wert, supra note 43, at 140.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 137, 142.
50. Id. at 145.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. The Medical Liability Insurance Crisis: A Review of the Situation in
Pennsylvania, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
Comm. of Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 60 (2003).
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concentrate on raising and training dogs because they do not
discriminate on the basis of human appearances. Unfortunately,
despite her apparent intelligence, warm personality, and the
unfairness of her condition, Heather is probably right-I saw her
face, as did others who tearfully heard her testimony. If Heather
lives to be seventy-eight years old, an award of $250,000-the limit
for non-economic damages in many tort reform packages-would
compensate her at the rate of $3,571 per annum for her shattered
life. 4
Heather's story is not the only example of patients' injuries
defying economic accounting. When I was conducting research in
North Carolina, a young mother of two children was rendered
permanently blind. In other cases patients lost sexual or reproductive
functions, injuries that were very real, but the losses could not be
easily calculated like medical expenses or loss of income.
There is often conceptual confusion in the mind of the public
about non-economic damages. Such damages are often simply
characterized as "pain and suffering." Indeed, pain and suffering
developed as an element of damages to compensate people for their
physical and emotional suffering. But jurors are often instructed to
also consider such things as monetary compensation for
disfigurement, loss of parental guidance, loss of parental
companionship, loss of moral training from parents, loss of marriage
prospects, loss of consortium (e.g., companionship and sexual
congress), emotional distress, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment
of life.55 To calculate non-economic damages, juries are instructed
that there is no fixed formula to determine the proper amount and
that they must apply their collective wisdom and common sense,
being neither stingy nor generous.
56
Recent research by Lucinda Finley documents some of the non-
economic damages suffered by women as a result of medical
54. If she were to invest the money wisely, the amount would be higher.
Jurors are often instructed to consider this possibility and reduce the award to
"present value," that is, consider what the award given today will be worth in
the future.
55. RONALD EADES, JURY INSTRUCTION ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS
§§ 6-18 to 6-20 (3d ed. 1993); THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN
DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001).
56. EADES, supra note 55.
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negligence. 57 These included injuries due to sexual assault,
pregnancy loss, infertility, and gynecological problems, each of
which resulted in emotional distress, grief, social adjustment, and an
altered sense of self, impaired relationships, and impaired physical
capacities such as reproduction and sexual gratification. 58 In some
cases failure to diagnose breast cancer in its early stages resulted in
the surgical removal of breasts, physical pain, and emotional fears of
an untimely death.59 But such pain and suffering was not limited to
females. In one case the misdiagnosis of a twenty-eight-year-old
man's stomach pain resulted in partial removal of his bowel and
scrotum, leaving him impotent and infertile.60 In another instance, a
doctor used undiluted acid to treat a fifty-four-year-old man's genital
warts resulting in severe bums to his scrotum and penis, permanent
scarring, and severe pain during sexual intercourse.
6 1
Much of the current debate around tort reform is focused on
"capping" these non-economic damages at $250,000.62 More will be
said about this subject later.
63
III. THE INCIDENCE AND GENESIS OF CLAIMS AGAINST
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
A. The Incidence of Claims Is Much Lower than the
Incidence of Injury
One of the most striking findings of the Harvard medical
malpractice project is that seven times as many patients suffered
from a medical negligence injury as filed a claim.64 Put in different
words, for every seven patients who suffered a negligent injury, just
one claim was filed.65 Claims were also filed in cases in which the
57. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women,
Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1281, 1308-12 (2004).
58. Id. at 1281.
59. Id. at 1310-13.
60. Id. at 1286.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 1.
63. See infra Part IX.
64. WEILER ET AL., supra note 21, at 69-76. This book is based on
HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN
NEW YORK (1990).
65. WEILER ETAL., supra note 21, at 70.
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research team of health care providers concluded that there was no
negligence. 66 For every doctor or hospital charged with a claim
where no negligence was found, however, there were seven valid
claims that were not filed.
67
Earlier research by Danzon, using a database from California,
concluded that "at most 1 in 10 negligent injuries resulted in a
claim." 68 Similarly, Andrews' study found that, of 1,047 patients
who experienced a medical error, only thirteen patients made a
claim.
69
Frank Sloan and Chee Hsieh studied 220 childbirths in Florida
in 1987 that involved death or permanent injury to the child.70 The
families of the children were interviewed, and the data were
supplemented by an independent medical review of the records by
physicians. 71 Of the 220 cases, twenty-three parents sought legal
advice. 72 These tended to be cases in which the child suffered very
serious injuries and the independent reviewing physicians concluded
that negligence was probably involved.73 Yet, not a single suit was
filed in any of the 220 cases. 74 Sloan and Hsieh concluded that:
The lack of claimants among the 220 women whose babies
had serious birth-related injuries and the failure of 23
women to obtain [legal] representation runs counter to the
"conventional wisdom" that patients sue when they obtain
less than a "perfect result." In fact, lawyers filter out many
potential claims that injury victims might lose.75
66. Id. at 71.
67. Michael Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and
Finding Real Solutions, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 693, 702, 703 (1994),
presents one of the clearest expositions of these findings in a review of
WEILER ET AL., supra note 21. In further calculations from the Weiler et al.
data, Saks points out that the probability of a health care provider being sued
for a negligent injury is 0.029 whereas the probability of being sued for a non-
negligent injury is 0.0013. Saks, supra, at 715.
68. DANZON, supra note 28, at 24.
69. ANDREWS, supra note 32, at 12.
70. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision
to File a Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 413 (1995).
71. Id. at 418.
72. Id. at 430.
73. Id. at 428.
74. Id. at 430.
75. Id.
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Legal scholars and social scientists have attempted to understand
why people make claims, why people fail to make claims, and the
general process of "disputing."6 Claims that end up in court are
only the tip of the iceberg. A fraction of negligent injuries result in
grievances, and just a fraction of grievances result in claims.77 The
vast majority of claims are settled, either by a payment to the
claimant or by the claimant dropping the claim.78 The remaining
fraction-between seven and ten percent in medical malpractice
cases-are actually adjudicated by a judge or jury. 
79
One of the reasons for the failure to claim is that the injured
party does not discover that medical negligence was the cause of the
injury. Andrews found that some physicians did not include errors in
the hospital records because they wanted to avoid litigation.80 Since
patients have an illness that caused them to seek treatment in the first
place, it is easy for them to believe that an injury is a natural
outcome of the treatment. 81 Other research has indicated that mass
media claims that Americans will sue at the drop of a hat are false.
82
In fact many people are reluctant to sue because of widely shared
beliefs that it is improper to do so. 83 When medical accidents occur
there is some evidence that if doctors apologize or express sympathy
for an adverse outcome and the injury is not too serious, patients do
76. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55
MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 631 (1980-81); Herbert M. Kritzer, W.A. Bogart, & Neil Vidmar, The
Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canada and
the United States, 25 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 499 (1991); STEPHEN DANIELS &
JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 114-35 (1995).
77. Galanter, supra note 76, at 1099-02.
78. Id. at 1100-01.
79. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 24-25.
80. ANDREWS, supra note 32, at 7.
81. Many medically proper treatments for illnesses nevertheless contain
small risks of injury or death. These "iatrogenic" injuries need to be
distinguished from negligent injuries.
82. See, e.g., Taylor & Thomas, supra note 6; Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J.
MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your Guide, 80
JUDICATURE 64 (1996); Galanter, supra note 76.
83. See, e.g., David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders,
and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 551
(1984).
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not sue.84 But there is an additional problem, namely the need to
find a lawyer to take the case.
IV. OBSTACLES TO FILING A LAWSUIT, THE NEED FOR A LAWYER,
AND THE CONTINGENCY FEE SYSTEM
A patient injured through medical negligence has a number of
daunting hurdles to overcome. The best way to illustrate the issues is
with a hypothetical example, based roughly on the facts of a real
case.
A. The Case of John Worker
Assume John Worker, age 35, made $40,000 per year in his
construction job. He has a wife and two young children. His total
assets include $10,000 in savings and $15,000 of equity in his home,
but like many Americans he does not carry health insurance. During
medical treatment for a benign tumor, Mr. Worker incurred a serious
injury that required six months of hospitalization. Despite his
eventual recovery, the injury will prevent him from working for the
rest of his life. In addition, he has partial paralysis on the right side
of his body and chronic pain severe enough to frequently require
strong painkillers. Furthermore, assume the following:
1. Negligence has occurred, or, more properly, it appears
that negligence has occurred, because "negligence" is a
legal concept that has to be admitted by the defendant or
proved in court.
2. The uncontested economic losses to Mr. Worker are:
a. Past medical bills (intensive care and rehabilitation):
$300,000
b. Future medical bills resulting from injury, at
$15,000 per year, for his life expectancy of thirty-
nine years to age seventy-four: $585,000
c. Past income lost during year of recovery: $40,000
d. Future income loss to age sixty-five at $40,000 per
84. See, e.g., Marlyrm L. May & David B. Stengel, Who Sues Their
Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REv.
105, 110-11(1990).
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year for twenty-nine years, plus expected
inflation/promotion adjustments: $1,200,000
e. Total economic losses: $2,125,000
Assume the defendant physician contests the claim of negligent
injury. To prove negligence and obtain compensation Mr. Worker
must:
1. Request, receive, and review his medical records;
2. Determine the appropriate law and the appropriate court
venue for a lawsuit;
3. File a lawsuit and pay the required filing fees;
4. Find and retain a medical expert (or experts) to review
the medical records and who is willing to testify that
negligence was the cause of the injury. Mr. Worker will
probably also need an expert to testify about the degree
of his disability and an economic expert to testify about
his future medical and financial losses;
5. Pay those experts (fees of $500 per hour or more are
common for the medical experts);
6. Take the depositions (examination under oath, prior to
trial, to learn the basis of the opinions) of the
defendant's experts. This includes paying the experts'
hourly fees for deposition time and travel costs to
wherever they are located;
7. Perhaps have to retain additional experts in light of
what is learned from the defendant's experts during
discovery;
8. Prepare all of this information for trial;
9. Pay his experts who testify at trial for their time and
travel costs;
10. Incur additional costs, e.g., court fees.
None of that guarantees Mr. Worker will receive any money.
As discussed below, about forty percent of medical malpractice
lawsuits are dropped before the case goes to trial, and doctors win
approximately three of every four cases tried before juries. In
addition, litigation expenses add up. In complicated trials it is not
unusual for the plaintiff to incur costs of $100,000 to $300,000 for
experts and associated expenses!
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Like many Americans, Mr. Worker doesn't understand the law
or know how to file his case, find experts, or conduct depositions
(even if he were physically able). And he doesn't have money to pay
the experts (let's say $200,000 in his case). Mr. Worker will,
therefore, have to find and retain a lawyer.
B. Plaintiff Lawyers and the Contingency Fee System
Continuing with our hypothetical example, assume:
1. Mr. Worker finds a lawyer who investigates his case.
Mr. Worker most likely will need a specialist in medical
malpractice litigation, because proving medical
negligence is often very complex and difficult. The
investigation will entail a thorough review of the case
that includes an initial screening, and hiring of one or
more medical experts to review the files and assist the
lawyer in understanding the specific medical issues in
the case, a necessary requirement in order to negotiate
with the defense lawyers and examine and cross-
examine expert witnesses at trial. The investigation will
possibly take the lawyer many weeks of research (with
salaried paralegals and secretaries). Many hours may
be spent in these endeavors before the lawyer even
decides medical negligence has occurred and files a
lawsuit. After filing the lawyer will face additional
court filings, hours or even days of depositions (pre-trial
examinations of plaintiff and defense experts and other
witnesses, including Mr. Worker). There is also likely
to be travel to perhaps distant locations to depose these
witnesses. The lawyer will also spend hours drafting
motions on the law and responses to motions from
defense lawyers. Some of these pretrial activities may
entail appearances before the trial judge. In Mr.
Worker's case trial time is estimated at two weeks.
During trial, the lawyer may possibly spend eighteen
hour days in actual trial time and preparation. In
complex cases the lawyer may often need to retain co-
counsel (also paid, of course) to handle the workload. It
is likely that the defendant will have multiple lawyers
and the plaintiff lawyer cannot afford to be outgunned.
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2. The lawyer agrees to advance $200,000 to pay the
experts and agrees to work the case on a contingency
fee basis, that is, on a contract that specifies there will
be no financial cost to Mr. Worker if he loses his case
against the doctor.
3. In return, the specialist lawyer asks for 33% of Mr.
Worker's verdict recovery if the case settles before trial
and 40% if the case goes to trial.85 The contract may
specify an even higher percentage of recovery, perhaps
45%, if Mr. Worker wins but the defendant appeals the
verdict to a higher court, entailing additional time and
expense for the lawyer. (Keep in mind that there is a
40% chance that the claim will have to be abandoned
before trial and only about a 25% chance of prevailing
if the case is decided by a jury. A loss of Mr. Worker's
case will result in the lawyer losing the monetary
investment and perhaps the many hours of legal work.)
4. There will be a substantial delay before the claim is
resolved. Research indicates that, for medical
malpractice cases, three to six years elapse between
injury and payment to the plaintiff.86 Trial cases, which
tend to be at the far end of this estimate, may be even
longer if the defense appeals the verdict.
87
85. The 40% is a figure used by some North Carolina lawyers. In other
states the figure is 33%. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS,
AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
289 n.20 (2004). In Wisconsin and some other states the fees in medical
malpractice cases are limited by law to a sliding scale. Id. Thus, in Wisconsin
the fee for cases recovering $1 million or less is limited to 33% and amounts
over $1 million are limited to 20%. Id. The Florida Constitution limits
contingent attorney fees in medical malpractice to 30% of the first $250,000
recovered and 10% of everything above that amount. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §
26.
86. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005).
87. THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, No. NCJ 206240,
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001: TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS
IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 9 (2004) (finding that 27.7% of medical malpractice
trials with plaintiff winners were appealed by defendants).
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C. More About Retaining a Lawyer
Recall that Sloan and Hsieh88 showed that, of twenty-three
potential claimants who sought legal advice, all had difficulty finding
a lawyer willing to take their case. 89 Research by Herbert Kritzer
examined the decisions of plaintiff lawyers to take or decline cases.
90
Because lawyers working on a contingency fee basis have their own
time and money at stake, they tend to carefully screen cases and
weed out those that have minor injuries, low damages potential, or a
low potential of winning at trial. 91 In ordinary cases lawyers may
decline as many as nine cases in ten; in medical malpractice cases the
proportion of declined cases may be even higher.92 Economic reality
drives lawyers' decisions to accept or reject cases.
Combined with the factors of patients not discovering that they
are victims of negligence or patients' reluctance to sue even if
negligence is discovered, lawyers' rejection of cases helps explain
the low claiming rates found in the Harvard study and subsequent
studies. 93 Patients who find a lawyer and file lawsuits are more
likely to have suffered a serious injury and to have a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on liability and demonstrating serious
economic damages.
If the plaintiff wins some readers of this Essay may view the big
percentage of the recovery that is taken by the plaintiff lawyer as
unfair. Without a lawyer, however, the patient would receive
nothing. Kritzer's research, moreover, suggests that when the
rewards of winning cases are spread over the losses incurred when
plaintiffs do not prevail, the result is an average hourly fee that is
comparable to that of other professionals. 94 Of course, some lawyers
88. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 70.
89. Id. at 418 (noting that although 23 victims discussed filing a claim with
a lawyer, none filed a malpractice claim).
90. KRITZER, supra note 85; see also VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 49-92
(analyzing variables related to cases that resulted in trial).
91. See generally KRITZER, supra note 85 (discussing a thorough study of
the contingency fee client screening process).
92. Kritzer's research on cases in general indicates that, as a result of these
hurdles to a successful litigation outcome, plaintiff's lawyers screen out
approximately ninety percent of cases at the point of initial contact by the
potential client. See id. at 67-89 (discussing medical malpractice in particular
at 87-88).
93. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
94. KRITZER, supra note 85, at 218 ("[T]he typical contingency fee
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who have greater skills and experience are more successful than
other lawyers. Those lawyers average greater income, just as
specialist doctors make more than non-specialist doctors.
D. Defense Lawyers
Digressing briefly, defense lawyers are typically paid on an
hourly basis rather than by a contingency fee and do not assume the
costs of litigation. They are paid by the doctor's liability insurer
regardless of whether the case is won, lost, or settled. The doctor's
liability insurer bears the litigation costs even when a claim is
dropped or results in no payment after a jury trial. Cumulatively,
these litigation costs are not trivial, running into thousands or
millions of dollars annually.
95
V. TRIAL BY JUDGE AND JURY
If Mr. Worker does file a lawsuit, he and his lawyer must
anticipate the possibility of a jury trial. Trial by judge and jury is at
the center of the controversy about medical malpractice and the tort
system.96 Juries are accused of being pro-plaintiff, incompetent to
evaluate the experts who testify at trial, moved by sympathies for
persons with severe injuries regardless of negligence, and overly
generous or erratic in making damage awards.
97
Note the phrase "trial by judge and jury," because the judge's
role in a trial is ignored by most critics of the jury system. The trial
judge presides over the trial and hears and sees the same evidence as
the jury. Before the jury's verdict can be recorded as a legal
judgment, the judge must agree that the evidence was sufficient to
support the verdict. If the judge disagrees on the issue of negligence,
he or she can set aside all or parts of the verdict by invoking the
common law power of "judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The
parties then face the prospect of a new trial if they want to contest the
judgment. If the judge believes that the amount of damages is too
high, the amount can be reduced through the legal device called
practitioner can expect ... 90 percent of cases ... to produce a fee premium on
the order of 25 to 30 percent of what market-rate hourly fee work generates.").
95. Vidmar et al., supra note 86.
96. See CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that
insurers blame jury awards for price jumps).
97. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 7.
1234
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"remittitur." If the plaintiff is unwilling to accept the reduced award,
the judge can order a new trial. Even if the judge agrees completely
with the jury, the defendant can still appeal the verdict to a higher
court. In the appellate court, a panel of judges might adjust the
verdict or order a new trial. Judges use these powers on a regular
basis. 98 Thus, the phrase "trial by judge and jury" correctly reflects
the fact that the jury verdict is not the final word. The jury's
decision can be overturned or modified by the trial judge or appellate
court judges.
A. Plaintiffs Lose Most Jury Trials
Many studies have examined win rates in medical malpractice
trials and their findings contradict widespread beliefs about jury
verdicts. For example, The Bureau of Justice Statistics
systematically sampled jury verdicts in 1992, 1996, and 2001 in
courts representing the seventy-five most populous counties in the
United States. 99 Of the 7,948 tort cases that reached trial in 2001,
there were 1,156 medical malpractice cases in the sample, and
ninety-six percent of these were tried before juries. 100  In 1992,
plaintiffs won 30.5% of jury trials, but in 2001 the win rate dropped
to 26.3%, roughly one case in four.' 0 ' Win rates vary slightly by
state. 1°2 In North Carolina, for example, plaintiffs prevail in about
one in five cases.
1 03
B. Jurors Tend to View Plaintiff Claims With Skepticism
The assertion that jurors decide cases out of sympathy for
injured plaintiffs rather than the legal merits of the case is one of the
98. For an example, see id., chs. 9-10.
99. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, No.
NCJ-154346, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY
CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995); CAROL J. DEFRANCES &
MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, No. NCJ 173426,
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1996: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996 (1999); COHEN, supra note 87.
100. COHEN, supra note 87, at 2, tbl. 1.
101. Id. at 7, tbl.7.
102. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 76, at 126.
103. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 25; Neil Vidmar, Testimony on Tort Reform
and Medical Malpractice, North Carolina House Blue Ribbon Task Force on
Medical Malpractice, Raleigh, N.C., Jan 7, 2004 [hereinafter Testimony of
Neil Vidmar].
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most persistent claims of opponents of civil jury trial. 104 Such claims
have been made about malpractice juries in the United States since at
least the nineteenth century. 1° 5 Yet, research finds little support for
these claims.
Interviews with North Carolina jurors who decided medical
malpractice cases showed that jurors viewed the plaintiffs' claims
with great skepticism. 06 Jurors expressed their attitudes in two main
themes: first, too many people want to get something for nothing,
and second, most doctors try to do a good job and should not be
blamed for a simple human misjudgment. 10 7 Indeed, these attitudes
were even expressed in some of the cases in which jurors decided for
the plaintiff, i.e., concern that the verdict might have an adverse
effect on the doctor's practice. 10 8 This does not mean that in every
case jurors held these views. Sometimes, evidence of the doctor's
behavior caused jurors to be angry about the negligence.l°9 Yet even
in these latter cases the interviews indicated that the jurors had
initially approached the case with open minds. "1
0
Professor Valerie Hans interviewed jurors who decided tort
cases, including medical malpractice, as part of a larger study of
business and health provider defendants, and she obtained similar
findings."' Hans concluded that jurors often penalized plaintiffs
who did not meet high standards of credibility and behavior,
including those who did not act or appear as injured as they claimed,
those who did not appear deserving due to their already high
standard of living, those with preexisting medical conditions, and
104. See generally VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 3-8 (summarizing criticisms of
juries in the tort system).
105. See KENNETH ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ORIGINS AND LEGACY 30 (1990).
106. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 169-71.
107. Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury
Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J.
217, 252-54 (1993) (summarizing research on jurors attitudes that revealed
juries may give doctors the benefit of the doubt).
108. Id. at 262.
109. Id. at 252-53.
110. Id.
111. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 127-29 (2001).
1236
Spring 2005] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS
those who did not do enough to help themselves recover from their
• 112
injuries.
C. Jury Verdicts Tend to Be Consistent with Judgments
of Neutral Medical Experts
An important study of medical malpractice litigation by Mark
Taragin et al. compared jury verdicts with the judgments of doctors
hired by an insurance company to review the medical records to
provide a neutral assessment of whether they believed medical
personnel had acted negligently." 3  These decisions were
confidential and could not be obtained by the plaintiff or used at
trial. 114 The research team compared the doctors' ratings with jury
verdicts. The jury verdicts tended to be consistent with these
assessments.1 1 5 Moreover, the study also found that judgments for
the plaintiff were not correlated with the severity of the plaintiffs
injury.116 The results, therefore, are inconsistent with the claim that
juries decide for the plaintiff out of sympathy rather than by applying
the legal standard of negligence.
D. Judges Agree With Jury Verdicts
Some studies asked trial judges to make independent
assessments of who should have prevailed in civil cases over which
they presided. 1 7 The judgments were made while the jury was still
deliberating and therefore were not contaminated by knowledge of
the outcome. 118 The judge's decision was then compared to the jury
112. Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 85 (1992).
113. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity
of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 780 (1992). Other research bearing on judgments of medical
negligence is reported in Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison
of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 777 (1997); SLOAN ET AL., supra note 43, ch. 6.
114. Taragin et al., supra note 113, at 781.
115. Id. at 782.
116. Id.
117. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994).
118. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 117, at 52.
1237
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:1217
verdict in that case. 119 Although the research did not specifically
focus on malpractice juries, the findings indicate that there was high
agreement between the judge and the jury. 120 Moreover, in instances
when the judge would have decided differently than the jury, the
judge usually indicated that, nevertheless, the jury could reasonably
have come to a different conclusion from the trial evidence. 121
Other studies asked large national samples of judges to draw on
their professional experience with juries and give a general opinion
about jury decisions. 122 The overwhelming number of these judges
give the civil jury high marks for competence, diligence, and
seriousness, even for complex cases.1
23
E. No Evidence Supports Claims of a "Deep Pockets " Effect
Closely related to the claim of "jury sympathy" verdicts is the
claim that juries are more likely to render verdicts against doctors,
hospitals, and corporations, not because they are seen as negligent,
but only because the jurors perceive them as having the ability to pay
large awards-a so-called "deep pockets" effect. A number of
research studies have assessed this hypothesis and find no support for
it. 124  This general finding includes experiments that specificallytested for a deep pockets effect in medical malpractice cases. 125
F. Little Evidence Supports the Claim that Juries Are
"Overwhelmed" By Plaintiffs'Experts
An often-repeated charge is that jurors are overwhelmed by
experts, particularly the plaintiff experts, in medical malpractice
cases. 126 This confusion and deference to experts, it is alleged, plays
to the advantage of plaintiffs because the jury simply defers to the
119. Id. at ch. 5.
120. Id. at 56.
121. Id. at ch. 34.
122. These surveys are reviewed in Brief of Amici Curiae Neil Vidmar et al.
at *6-*9, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709),
1998 WL 734434.
123. Id.
124. For a review of this research, see HANS, supra note 11 at 178-87.
125. Vidmar, supra note 107.
126. See Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort
Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data From Medical
Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 885-91 (1994); VIDMAR, supra note 3, at
3-8.
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plaintiff's experts and allows juror sympathies for the plaintiff to be
the basis of their verdict. There is fuzzy logic in this claim, however,
because it ignores the fact that defendants also cross-examine
plaintiff experts and call their own experts who offer opinions
contrary to the plaintiffs experts. Moreover, the defendants
typically call more experts than the plaintiff. 1
27
Systematic studies of jury responses to experts lead to the
conclusion that (a) jurors do not automatically defer to experts and
(b) jurors have a basic understanding of the evidence in malpractice
and other cases. 128  They understand that the adversary system
produces experts espousing opinions consistent with the side that
called them to testify. 129 Moreover, they carefully scrutinize and
compare the testimony of opposing experts.13
0
A series of case studies reported in Medical Malpractice and the
American Jury documented the processes by which jurors reached
their verdicts. 13 1 Interviews with jurors indicated that, in general,
through collective discussions about the evidence they came to have
an essential understanding of the case and the issues in the dispute.'
32
While the jurors may not have backgrounds in medicine, they
became educated about the basic issues during the trial through the
processes of expert testimony from both sides and from cross-
examination. 133  Deliberation and collective wisdom produced an
understanding that resulted in a justifiable verdict.
127. Vidmar, supra note 126, at 902.
128. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence,
66 BROOK. L. REv. 1121 (2001); Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi6 & Valerie P. Hans,
Jurors' Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the
Message, 28 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 441 (2003); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Neil Vidmar et al., supra note 122, at * 10-* 14 (summarizing research on juror
competence in complex cases).
129. See sources cited supra note 128.
130. Kutnjak Ivkovid & Hans, supra note 128 (examining jurors' reactions
to experts who testify in civil trials and finding jurors consider both the
message and the messenger in their evaluation).
131. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 127-82.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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G. Jury Damage Awards Have Increased but There are Multiple
Possible Explanations
The Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that in 2001 the
median verdict in medical malpractice trials when plaintiffs prevailed
was $431,000, compared to $253,000 in 1992.134 Punitive damages
were awarded in four percent of cases, 135 and those tended to involve
cases of gross malfeasance, such as sexual assaults on patients. 136
Multiple reasons may be offered for the increase in damage
awards. Juries may have become more generous. Patients may have
sustained more serious injuries. Plaintiff lawyers may have become
more adept at "proving" damages by using experts who document
economic losses better than in the past. An additional possible cause
is that the cost of negligent medical injuries and lost income may
have increased. During the 1990s medical costs increased 51.7% and
general inflation, which is reflected in lost wages, increased
26.2%. 
13 7
Another possible explanation for the increase is that more cases
with claims of more serious injuries were tried to juries in 2001,
compared to 1992. This last possible explanation needs elaboration.
A recent study of medical malpractice litigation in Florida found
that, compared to the first three years of the 1990s, during the first
three years of the 2000 decade there were more settled cases
involving claims of negligent deaths and fewer cases involving less
serious injuries. 138 Given the fact that settlements typically occur
only after three to six years, this change in case mix likely occurred
during the middle of the 1990s, not at the turn of the new century. 39
The change in types of cases is unlikely to explain all of the increase
in awards, but it does appear to be a possible partial explanation.
In short, like many other parts of the medical malpractice
134. COHEN, supra note 87, at 7, tbl.7.
135. Id.
136. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 55, at 127-28, 140-45.
137. Finley, supra note 57; see also U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 46.
138. Vidmar et al., supra note 86; for similar findings in Texas, see Bernard
S. Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1998-2002, U. TEX. L. & ECON. (Research Paper No. 30, at 20, 22, 34-
36 (Mar. 2005)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=-678601.
139. Id.
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controversy, the questions about damages are complex, and at
present there are not satisfactory answers to all of these questions.
H Damage Awards Tend to Correlate With Severity of Injury
Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein found that the magnitude of
jury awards in a sample of medical malpractice tort cases positively
correlated with the severity of the plaintiffs' injuries, except that
injuries resulting in death tended to result in awards substantially
lower than injuries resulting in severe permanent injury, such as
quadriplegia. 140  While Bovbjerg et al. concluded that there was
considerable variability within categories of injury severity, later
research by Sloan and van Wert provided a plausible explanation for
this variability, namely that economic losses vary considerably
within each level of injury severity. 14 1 The economic loss for a
quadriplegic who is forty years old with a yearly income of $200,000
and a family of three young children would ordinarily be much
greater than an identical quadriplegic who is retired, widowed,
seventy-five years old, has no dependents, and whose annual income
never exceeded $35,000.
Another study of malpractice verdicts in New York, Florida, and
California also found that jury awards of prevailing plaintiffs in
malpractice cases were correlated with the severity of the injury.
142
Daniels and Martin found a similar pattern. 1
43
I. The "Pain and Suffering" Component ofAwards
As noted earlier, the general damages portion of verdicts is often
labeled "pain and suffering," and this is an inappropriate label,
because some of these elements of damages involve injuries that are
not strictly pain and suffering. 144 In medical malpractice cases, for
example, negligent administration of a drug that makes the patient
permanently psychotic would be a severe trauma that, aside from
140. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908 (1989).
141. See Sloan & van Wert, supra note 43.
142. Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards For Medical Malpractice and Post-
Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 265, 287 (1998).
143. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 76, at 127-37.
144. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text; see also Vidmar et al.,
supra note 142, at 296-98.
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medication and health care, can have many other economic
consequences, including diminished job performance.
Interviews with North Carolina jurors who decided medical
malpractice cases indicated that jurors considered the effects of
disfigurement and emotional trauma on chances for promotion, the
likelihood of a marriage dissolving as a result of the injury, and the
economic consequences as well as strict pain and suffering. 145 Jury
instructions caution jurors that they should not award compensation
for general damages when the same element is included in special
damages, but these lines of demarcation are often indistinct.
146
Vidmar, Gross, and Rose's examination of medical malpractice
verdicts in New York, Florida, and California found that the general
damages portion of awards was positively related to severity of
plaintiff injury. 147 That is, the more serious the injury the higher the
mean and median levels of general damages. The exception to this
trend was that in cases involving death the mean and median awards
tended to be substantially lower than in cases of very serious
permanent disabilities.14 8  That finding is consistent with the
Bovbjerg et al. findings. 149 While these verdict statistics provide no
information on the actual basis of the jury's decisions, there is no
evidence that these decisions result from caprice or unwarranted
sympathy.
Medical Malpractice and the American Jury describes several
experiments in which jurors, with detailed facts about injuries, were
asked to award damages for pain and suffering and disfigurement.
150
Senior lawyers, including some retired North Carolina judges, were
independently presented with the same facts and asked to indicate
their professional judgment about the appropriate award. The data
showed that jurors tended to render awards similar to those of legal
145. Vidmar et al., supra note 142, at 274; VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 241; see
also Neil Vidmar et al., Damage Awards and Jurors' Responsibility
Ascriptions in Medical Versus Automobile Negligence Cases, 12 BEHAV. SC.
& L. 149 (1994) (posing hypothetical situations to jurors and resulting in jurors
not differentially awarding pain and suffering damages across conditions).
146. See, e.g., EADES, supra note 55, at 321.
147. Vidmar et al., supra note 142, at 281-99.
148. Id. at 296.
149. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 140.
150. VIDMAR, supra note 3, ch. 19.
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professionals. The data also showed that jurors' reasoning on
damages was similar to that of the professionals.
J. Outlier Awards Tend Not to Withstand
Post- Verdict Adjustments
Despite the substantial evidence indicating that juries are
ordinarily conservative in deciding damages in malpractice cases,
there are exceptions resulting in what are commonly labeled "outlier
awards."
15 1
There are a number of reasons for outlier awards.' 52 One is that
doctors might contest the case solely on liability and not contest
damages at all. The plaintiff, on the other hand, presents the losses
through experts who give a high-end version of the plaintiff's losses.
The judge instructs the jury to decide damages solely on the evidence
but the jurors have only the plaintiff's figures to work with. Despite
reservations the jurors follow the judge's instructions and accept the
plaintiffs suggested award, because that is the only evidence that
they have. In other instances, the defense may call an economist
who offers an alternative to the plaintiffs damages estimate; the
level of damages may be quite high due to the seriousness of the
injury, and the jury might use this as a floor from which damages are
estimated. Additionally, in some jurisdictions juries are presented
with the gross amount of a loss or of a life care plan that is not
reduced to present value. 1
53
The final explanation casts the jury in a less favorable light.
Specifically, because of the evidence brought out at trial the jurors
become so outraged at the negligence of the defendant that they
appear to add a punitive component into their compensatory award,
contrary to the judge's instructions. 154 These outlier awards are not
151. See Steve Cohen, Malpractice: Behind a $26-Million Award to a Boy
Injured in Surgery, N.Y., Oct. 1, 1990, at 41 (presenting in depth analysis of
one particularly large "outlier award"), reprinted in VIDMAR, supra note 3, at
95.
152. See VIDMAR, supra note 3, at ch. 7.
153. Id. at ch. 16.
154. A case study of one such award and its eventual reduction by the trial
judge is reported in Id. at chs. 9-10. Some other probable cases of jury outrage
are reported in Vidmar et al., supra note 142, at 287-90.
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as frequent as portrayed in the mass media,'55  but they
unquestionably do occur.
Nevertheless, research evidence indicates that these verdicts
seldom withstand post-verdict proceedings. Two co-authors and I
examined malpractice verdicts in New York, Florida, and California
to determine what happened to the outlier awards. 156 We observed
that there are four main processes by which awards can be reduced.
Two of these invoke the "trial by judge and jury" explanation: the
judge reduces the award verdict through the legal mechanism of
remittitur, or the case is appealed and a higher court reduces the
award.157 Sometimes the sides agree that there was negligence but
disagree about the amount of damages and set a high-low agreement
prior to trial. 58 Most common of all, the plaintiff and the defendant
negotiate a post-trial settlement that is less than the jury verdict.
Our study empirically explored the fate of many of the outlier
awards. We found that some of the largest malpractice awards in
New York ultimately resulted in settlements between five and ten
percent of the original jury verdict. 159  My study of medical
malpractice awards in Pennsylvania found a similar reduction.
160
These findings are consistent with earlier research by Ivy Broeder,'
6 1
by researchers at the RAND Corporation, 162 and by researchers at
155. See, e.g., Bailis & MacCoun, supra note 82; Michael McCann et al.,
Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 113 (2001).
156. Vidmar et al., supra note 142, at 280-95.
157. Id. at 278.
158. High-low agreements are not uncommon. These occur in some cases in
which the plaintiff and defendant cannot close the gap on the amount of a
negotiated settlement. They agree to submit the case to the jury under the
condition that, if the jury verdict falls below a certain amount, or even if there
is a defense verdict, the plaintiff will receive a specified amount of money
anyway, and if the verdict is above a specified amount the defendant will pay
no more than the figure agreed to before trial. In this way both parties are
protected against outlier verdicts that either give the plaintiff little or nothing
or, alternatively, expose the defendant to an award that could severely injure
finances. The public and even the court may be unaware of the agreement but
such arrangements are legal and serve both parties well.
159. Vidmar et al., supra note 142, at 287-88.
160. See Neil Vidmar, Juries and Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Implications for Tort Reform in Pennsylvania, unpublished report (Jan.
28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
161. Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts
and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 349(1986).
162. MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND: THE INSTITUTE
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The National Center for State Courts. 163 Similarly, Merritt and Barry
conducted a detailed examination of jury awards in Franklin County
(Columbus) Ohio.' 64  They documented a number of post-trial
reductions in jury awards. 165 For example, a $12 million award was
reduced by the trial judge to $8.5 million and a $3 million award was
reduced by an appeals court to $1.5 million.'
66
Plaintiffs are willing to negotiate lesser amounts for three main
reasons. First, many plaintiffs would rather have the money
immediately than wait the years it would take to get the money if the
case were appealed. 167 Second, there is always a risk that an appeals
court will reduce the award or even overturn the verdict. 168 Third,
most of these outlier awards greatly exceed the medical provider's
insurance coverage. 169  While plaintiffs and their lawyers could
attempt to foreclose on the defendant's assets, they are very reluctant
to do so. 170 Therefore, the plaintiff negotiates a settlement around
the limit of the defendant's insurance coverage. High-low
agreements, too, usually take cognizance of the upper limits of
insurance coverage.'71
VI. Too MUCH EMPHASIS ON JURIES! CONSIDER
SETTLEMENT RATES
In recent research, I and my colleagues studied closed medical
malpractice claims in Florida. 72  Florida has required medical
liability insurers to file detailed reports of closed medical malpractice
claims with the Department of Health since 1975.' 73 Our research
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PosTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS (1987).
163. Brian Ostrom et al., So the Verdict Is In-What Happens Next?. The
Continuing Story of Tort Awards in the State Courts, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 97
(1993).
164. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in
Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 353-55 (1999).
165. Id. at 354-55.
166. Id. at 354.
167. Vidmar et al., supra note 142, at 278.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort
Law in Action, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 275, 284-85 (2001).
171. Vidmar, supra note 160.
172. Vidmar et al., supra note 86.
173. Id.
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centered on cases closed between 1990 and 2003. A total of 21,809
claims closed with a payment to the claimant during those fourteen
years. The study found that 20.2% of paid claims settled without the
claimant even resorting to a lawsuit, 6.3% of claims settled in
arbitration, and 70.8% settled before a jury verdict, leaving just 2.7%
of paid claims that resulted from a jury verdict. 1
74
To pursue this insight further, cases involving a million dollars
or more were singled out. 175 We found that 10.5% were settled
without a lawsuit and 4.6% were settled in arbitration, 77.4% settled
before or during trial, and only 7.6% resulted from a jury verdict.
Put in the obverse, more than 92% of claims with million dollar
payments were settled without a jury. Going further, our study found
that thirty-seven of the 831 million-dollar cases resulted in payments
over $5 million. Only two of these involved a jury trial. Five of the
831 cases exceeded $10 million dollars, but only one was the result
of a jury trial; of the remaining four cases one settled in pre-litigation
negotiations, and three settled before trial commenced.
Perhaps Florida is different than other states. It is hazardous to
generalize because each state has its own unique set of laws and legal
culture. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that data from the
North Carolina Lawyer 's Weekly, a publication of the North Carolina
Trial Lawyers Association, seems roughly consistent with the Florida
findings. 176 The data are not systematic, tend to report only large
cases, and often do not report the amount of the settlement.
Nevertheless, the data show some interesting patterns. As early as
the first part of the 1990s there were verdicts and settlements
exceeding $1 million. 177 Over the period from 1990 through 2002,
the number of million-dollar-plus settlements exceeded the number
174. Trial rates for medical malpractice cases usually range between seven
and ten percent of lawsuits. These include cases in which defendants prevail,
approximately seven or eight trials in ten. See VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 39.
The data reported here do not include plaintiff verdicts at trial, but they do
include cases that never became lawsuits. In short this data uses a different
numerator and different denominator than previous studies.
175. The payments were adjusted for inflation so that we could compare
earlier cases with later cases.
176. Testimony of Neil Vidmar, supra note 103. The same data have been
used by the North Carolina Trial Lawyers Association and by Medical Mutual
of North Carolina, a doctor-owned liability insurer. Id.
177. Id.
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of million-dollar-plus jury verdicts by a factor of over three to one.1
7 8
The average amounts of $1 million plus settlements, when
settlements were reported, were comparable to the jury awards.179 A
statistical test on the data indicated that the distributions and the
magnitudes of payments for jury verdicts and non-jury settlements
were not statistically different from one another.' In short, the
North Carolina findings also indicate that most of the payments
exceeding a million dollars involved settlements rather than jury
trial.
These findings have a major implication. Whether we are
talking about all cases or just million dollar cases, the process by
which claims are paid in Florida (and, it appears, also in North
Carolina) involves the negotiation table, not the jury room. In
Florida, settlements exceeded jury trials by a factor of more than nine
to one for million dollar cases. 18 1 We need to learn why these cases
were settled rather than put before juries. Was it a fear of large jury
awards-the "shadow effect"-that caused defendants to settle?
Alternatively, was the negligence and severity of loss so clear that it
made no sense to go to trial because defendants' liability insurers
would incur heavy litigation costs in the face of a likely win for the
patient? At this point we cannot say which of these opposing
explanations is correct. Both could be correct to some degree.182 At
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Vidmar et al., supra note 86.
182. Research by Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical
Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
877 (2002), on a sample of insurers' medical malpractice files indicated that
insurers tend to settle cases primarily based on whether their own internal
reviews by medical experts indicate the provider violated the standard of care.
Id. at 879. If they decide the standard was violated, they attempt to settle. Id.
at 886. Those authors concluded that claims proceed to trial only when the
plaintiff cannot be convinced that there was no violation of the standard and
cannot extract a reasonable offer from the insurer. Id. at 894. An earlier study
by Roger A. Rosenblatt & Andy Hurst, An Analysis of Closed Obstetric
Malpractice Claims, 74 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 710 (1989), examined
54 obstetric malpractice claims for negligence. Id. For cases in which
settlement payments were made, there was general consensus among insurance
company staff, medical experts, and defense attorneys that some lapse in the
standard of care had occurred. Id. at 712. No payments were made in the
forty-two percent of cases in which these various reviewers decided there was
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1217
the very least the findings strongly suggest that the emphasis on jury
verdicts appears misplaced.
VII. RISING CLAIMS AND RISING COSTS: A COMPLICATED ISSUE
The Florida data also allow us to partly address the question of
whether the frequency of malpractice claims has been rising and
whether, simultaneously, the costs of payouts also have. This is a
complicated issue and a contentious one, so I need to be very
cautious and emphasize very important qualifications of our findings.
We found that the number of claims involving payments to the
claimant increased between 1990 and 2003.183 Florida's population
also increased at the same time, however, as did the number of
licensed physicians.' 84 When adjusted for population the number of
paid claims per 100,000 residents in 2003 was no higher than in
1990. Similarly, paid claims per 100 licensed physicians also were
no higher.' 85 This would seem to support consumer groups who say
there has been no increase. But wait. Here is the problem.
Doctors and insurers say that the number of claims began to rise
steeply around the year 2000 and continued through 2003.181 Our
findings cannot speak to this matter for the following reason. After a
claim of negligence is made it usually takes between three and six
years before the claim is settled. 87 Thus, if claims began to rise in
2000 through 2003, the rise in paid claims is just beginning to occur
now. Also, our data were incomplete regarding claims resulting in
no payment. Claims with no payment also incur transaction costs to
defend. It is noteworthy that data collected by the National Center
for State Courts on a national sample of cases showed that while
there was an overall decline in medical malpractice case filings
between 1992 and 2001, filings did rise in 2002.181
The Florida closed claims data also revealed that, between 1990
and 2003, the inflation-adjusted cost of the average paid claim
no lapse in the standard of care. Id.
183. Vidmar et al., supra note 86.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Examining the Work of State Courts, 2002:
A National Perspective from the Courts Statistics Project 25 (2002), available
at http://www.ncsonline.org.
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showed a modest upward increase.' 8 9 Part of the explanation might
be that medical costs, which have increased at rates greater than the
Consumer Price Index,' 90 are the cause. But there are other
explanations. Our data also showed that on average the paid claims,
beginning in 2002, included a greater proportion of serious injuries,
including death.' 9'
One possible explanation for these last findings is that there
were more cases of serious injury. An alternative explanation is that
the rates of serious injury remained stable but more of the seriously
injured patients made claims. Either or both of these explanations
might be true, but again we must consider that the time lag from the
date of the injury to a settlement is between three and six years. That
lag indicates that the jump in serious claims began to occur around
1996 and was only reflected beginning about 2000. Thus, whatever
the cause, the genesis of the shift in serious injury claims began to
occur in the middle of the 1990s. Thus, the data show that the
average payment to claimants increased, but we cannot determine the
degree to which the increase was due to inflation or to different
mixes of cases being settled.
VIII. FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
Claims about frivolous litigation are based, in part, on findings
that in medical malpractice cases doctors prevail in approximately
seventy percent of cases that go to trial and that as many as forty
percent of cases filed against health care providers ultimately result
in no payment to the plaintiff. 192 Additionally, opponents of medical
malpractice litigation argue that jury verdicts, especially those
involving larger awards, encourage lawyers to file lawsuits in cases
that are without merit because doctors and liability insurers will
settle claims out of fear of a large and unjustified award if the case
goes before a jury.' 93 These claims are not supported by research
evidence.
189. Vidmar et al., supra note 86.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 40-41 (reviewing statistics from several
studies on settlement rates).
193. See e.g., http://www.sickoflawsuits.org.
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A. Liability Insurers Tend to Not Settle
Frivolous Cases
In interviews that I undertook with liability insurers in North
Carolina and other states, the most consistent theme from them was:
"We do not settle frivolous cases!,, 194 The insurers indicated that
there are minor exceptions, but their policy on frivolous cases was
based on the belief that, if they ever begin to settle cases just to make
them go away, their credibility will be destroyed, and this in turn will
encourage more litigation.1
95
B. Cases Dropped by Claimants Before Trial Are
Not Necessarily Frivolous
Medical Malpractice and the American Jury reports that despite
upfront screening by plaintiff lawyers, there is still a lot of
uncertainty about whether negligence has occurred. 196 Negligence
can usually only be determined after a lawsuit is filed, depositions
are taken, and expert opinions are obtained. As documented in that
book, research into the files of liability insurers showed that this is as
true of the defense side as it is of the plaintiff side: lawyers for the
defendants and their insurers get conflicting opinions as to whether
negligence has occurred. Sometimes, after an extensive process of
consulting with experts and taking depositions, it becomes
reasonably apparent that no legal negligence occurred, or that, in any
event, the case is not winnable because of the costs of pursuing it. At
this juncture plaintiff lawyers tend to drop the case. In North
Carolina nearly forty percent of filed cases were dropped on these
grounds. 197  Again, the point to be made is that it makes little
economic sense for a plaintiff lawyer to continue to invest time and
money in a case that is unlikely to win. Occasionally lawyers
misjudge the merits of cases and continue to pursue them, but far
more often they are dropped.
Thus, since both the plaintiff and the defendant are faced with
uncertainty, it is inappropriate to call the vast majority of dropped
194. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at chs. 7 & 8; see also Rosenblatt and Hurst,
supra note 182.
195. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at chs. 7 & 8.
196. Id.; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 164-85 (reporting systematic data
that are consistent with my conclusions).
197. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at chs. 3 & 4.
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cases "frivolous." Rather, they should be labeled "non-meritorious"
cases in recognition of the fact that both sides took them very
seriously at the beginning of the lawsuit.
C. Doctor's High Win Rates at Trial Do Not Mean the
Lawsuit was Frivolous
As discussed earlier, statistics indicate that, nationwide, doctors
prevail in as many as seventy percent of cases that go to trial.
198
Nevertheless, a plaintiffs loss at trial is not grounds for concluding
that the litigation was "frivolous."' 199 Cases that go to trial are ones
where negligence is uncertain. As discussed above,20 0 when pretrial
investigation shows that the case is clearly not winnable, lawsuits
tend to be dropped before trial. On the other hand, cases with clear
negligence tend to be settled, particularly if the parties can negotiate
the amount of damages. 20 1 Thus, only "close" cases tend to go to
trial.
There are a number of possible explanations, other than non-
merit, as to why doctor win rates at trial are so high.20 2 One reason is
that jurors generally tend to be skeptical of plaintiff claims and
essentially place a burden on the plaintiff that is greater than the
legally appropriate "balance of probabilities" standard.20 3 Another is
that plaintiffs often have a more difficult time obtaining and hiring
the experts, relative to the defense. 20 4 It is also important to observe
that, in many instances, plaintiffs who lost at trial against one doctor
nevertheless obtained settlements from other doctors who had been
named in the lawsuit.205 This might suggest that medical negligence
occurred in the case, albeit that at trial the jury did not think that the
evidence against the remaining defendant or defendants was
sufficient to find liability. On the other hand, it is possible that
despite insurers' insistence that they do not make settlements for
non-meritorious claims, in some instances they may decide that a
198. See supra note 192, and accompanying text.
199. VIDMAR, supra note 3.
200. Part VIII.B.
201. See supra note 182, and accompanying text.
202. VIDMAR, supra note 3.
203. Id. at 169-71 (discussing juror attitudes toward plaintiffs and
defendants); see supra Part VIII.B.
204. VIDMAR, supra note 3, at 72-76, 86-87.
205. Id. at 33-34.
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modest and confidential settlement payment avoids bad publicity for
the doctor and saves expensive litigation costs. Such a decision
could explain why some doctors settle.
20 6
IX. SOCIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: CAPS ON
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES
A. Plaintiff's Recovery and Effects on Insurance Premiums
Many proposals for tort reform blame juries for excessive and
unjustified pain and suffering awards and advocate a cap of $250,000
on these damages.2 0 7 As discussed above, there is more to non-
economic damages than pain and suffering, such as disfigurement,
loss of moral support and guidance from a parent. Aside from the
value judgment of whether someone with a debilitating injury or
these other losses can be adequately compensated by that cap, there
are other issues that need to be considered.
First, as described above, only a small percentage-about 8
percent-of million-dollar payments result from jury awards, the
target of the pain and suffering caps.20 8  In Mississippi, as an
illustration, the public and legislative debate centered on the need for
a cap because of the asserted large number of million-dollar jury
awards. 20 9 Yet Mississippi actually had only slightly more than one
million-dollar medical malpractice award each of those years. 210 A
cap is unlikely to have any major effect on malpractice costs if just
slightly over one million-dollar jury verdict occurs per year, although
it might have some effects on cases with lesser injuries.
Studies undertaken to assess the effects of caps on jury awards
and on any reductions in doctor's liability insurance premiums
206. Many doctors want to avoid the publicity, the emotional pressures, and
the time from her practice that a trial would entail. However, in other cases
doctors may insist on going to trial to clear their reputation. Id.
207. See supra note 1.
208. See supra, Part V.I & J.
209. Neil Vidmar and Leigh Ann Brown, Tort Reform and the Medical
Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and
Prescribing a Remedy 22 Miss. C.L. REV. 9-46 (2002). A subsequent article
that examines the Mississippi "liability crisis" in great detail and arrives at a
similar conclusion is E. Farish Percy, Checking Up on the Medical Malpractice
Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Are the Reforms the Cure? 73 Miss.
L.J. 1001 (2004).
210. Vidmar & Brown, supra note 209; Percy, supra note 209.
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generally show that the caps did reduce the amount of the plaintiffs
recovery. For example, a study of California jury trials occurring
between 1995 and 1999 by RAND's Institute for Civil Justice
showed that California's MICRA cap of $250,000 on non-economic
damages reduced awards about twenty-five percent in injury cases
and over fifty-one percent in cases involving death.2 1
A United States Government Accounting Office report showed
that states with caps on medical malpractice damages tended to have
lower premiums for doctors and that rate increases were lower in
states with caps. 212 The report also concluded, however, that it is not
possible to show a direct link between caps and premiums because
there are other factors that distinguish states with and without
caps. 213 Some states without caps, for example, have the lowest
premiums of all.214 One important other factor appears to be state
regulation of insurance premiums. In short, the evidence that caps
reduce or slow doctors' premium increases is at best unclear.
B. Injured Claimants Often Receive Less Than
Actual Economic Losses
Debates about medical malpractice reform often ignore effects
of the injuries on the lives and finances of plaintiffs. In their study of
birth and emergency room injury awards, Sloan and his colleagues
compared the plaintiffs' economic losses to the amount actually
received.215 On average, for cases that were settled prior to trial,
plaintiffs received only forty-eight percent of their losses.
216
Plaintiffs in cases that went to trial did better than plaintiffs in settled
cases, ultimately receiving twenty-two percent more than their
estimated economic losses.2 17 Sloan and Hseih further concluded
that persons with the most severe injuries were least likely to receive
adequate compensation.2 18 Cases that go to trial before juries are
211. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER
MICRA, at xvii-xx (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2004).
212. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 5.
213. Id. at 7.
214. Id. at 37.
215. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 43, at Chapter 9.
216. Id. at 195.
217. Id.
218. Frank Sloan & C. Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments:
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usually different than cases that are settled, so precise comparisons
between settled and trial cases are not possible. Plaintiffs settle at a
discount to avoid the costs and uncertainties of trial by judge and
jury as well as the fact that they receive needed money immediately
rather than months or years later.21 9 Nevertheless, the Sloan data do
suggest that on average, plaintiff lawyers, served their clients well
when cases did go to trial.
After conducting their detailed analyses, Sloan et al. concluded
that "few claimants received payments far above the mean for their
stage of resolution categories. The fact that even plaintiffs who were
successful at verdict received payments only moderately higher than
economic loss contradicts the notion that courts make very excessive
awards in medical malpractice cases.,
22 0
Studdert et al. examined the effects on injured patients of
California's $250,000 cap on non-economic damages.221  Their
findings indicate that reductions under the cap affected the patients
with the most severe injuries.222 They concluded:
Imposition of greater reductions on more severe injuries
may be justified if compensation for this particular group of
injuries were especially prone to excess. In fact available
evidence suggests the reverse is true: Plaintiffs with the
most severe injuries appear to be at the highest risk for
inadequate compensation. Hence, the worst-off may suffer
a kind of "double jeopardy" under caps.
223
C. Injured Plaintiff Outcomes with Caps: Back
to Mr. Worker
We can begin to grasp the recovery rate of injured parties by
returning to our hypothetical case of John Worker. Let us assume
that after six years of waiting Mr. Worker's case finally comes to
trial, and the jury determines that the doctor was negligent. Assume
further that the jury awards Mr. Worker's full economic losses of
Is the Compensation Fair? 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 997, 1025-29 (1990).
219. Id.
220. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 195.
221. David Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of
Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 54 (2004).
222. Id. at 63.
223. Id. (citations omitted).
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$2,125,000 plus $750,000 for non-economic losses ("pain and
suffering") yielding a total award of $2,875,000.
However, in Mr. Worker's state there is a cap on non-economic
damages. The judge reduces the non-economic loss to $250,000,
thus deducting $500,000 and entering a judgment of $2,375,000.
That is still a lot of money, but now calculate Mr. Worker's net
recovery after litigation expenses:
a. Final award $2,375,000
b. Lawyer fee @ 40% ($950,000)
c. Litigation expenses ($200,000)
Mr. Worker's net recovery: $1,225,000
Net recovery, however, needs to be compared to actual
economic losses to determine how Mr. Worker has fared. Thus we
calculate as follows:
a. Original economic loss $2,125,000
b. Net recovery $1,225,000
c. Mr. Worker's economic loss: ($900,000)
In short, even though Mr. Worker incurred $2,125,000 in
medical and income losses, in the end he will have an actual
$900,000 economic loss.
If there had been no cap on non-economic damages or if there
had been a cap with a higher limit, say $750,000 (not incidentally the
amount the jury awarded in this hypothetical example), Mr. Worker
would have received the jury's original award of $2,875,000. The
additional $500,000 that he would have received would almost have,
to use a common lawyer phrase, "made him whole." Well, not quite;
he would still be $600,000 short, but that is considerably less than
being $900,000 short.
Note that even with the full amount of the jury verdict before the
cap adjustment, Mr. Worker would still effectively have received no
compensation for his pain and suffering and other non-economic
losses. Whatever the jury's reasoning about the appropriateness of
the non-economic damages when it awarded him $750,000, in actual
effect the non-economic award would have offset most of Mr.
Worker's litigation expenses. Put bluntly, the pain and suffering
component would have defrayed most of his litigation expenses. In
other words the pain and suffering component would have mostly
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paid for his lawyer and the experts that were absolutely necessary to
get him compensation for his economic losses.
People will differ as to whether a cap system is fair under the
circumstances of the hypothetical Mr. Worker's case. Those who
believe that caps on pain and suffering reduce liability insurance
premiums will reasonably argue that the unfairness to Mr. Worker is
offset by the need to protect doctors so that they can serve the public.
Others will take a different view and feel that the injustice to Mr.
Worker trumps doctor interests.
Some may further feel that Mr. Worker's lawyer reaped a
windfall in this case. That feeling must, however, be judged against
the fact that the lawyer risked her own $200,000 to litigate the case,
and if Mr. Worker had not prevailed, that money would have been
lost. Additionally, the lawyer devoted many hours to the case and
had to pay secretaries, paralegals, and office expenses. Moreover, the
lawyer had less than a forty percent chance of prevailing in the case.
I chose a forty percent figure for the lawyer's contingency fee
for trial. I noted earlier that by law or by customary practice, some
lawyers claim only thirty-three percent and in other instances lawyer
fees are determined by a graduated scale with diminishing fee returns
as the settlement or award increases. Some lawyers calculate the
percentage of recovery after litigation expenses are deducted. Under
these conditions Mr. Worker's net recovery would be a little higher.
The reader can do the math.
A more important consideration is that this is not all of the story.
Mr. Worker has some additional claims against his jury award.
X. SUBROGATION CLAIMS/LIENS AGAINST
MR. WORKER'S AWARD
A. Liens Against the Award
Let us add a factor that has not been addressed at all in the
current debate about tort reform. Because Mr. Worker, like millions
of Americans, had no health insurance to cover his post-injury care
and because his wife received only minimum wage from her part-
time job, Mr. Worker's state's Medicaid program paid for his post-
injury medical bills. Recall that he incurred $300,000 in immediate
post-injury care and that, during the five and one-half years between
his discharge from the hospital and the trial verdict, he incurred
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medical expenses of $15,000 per year for a total of $82,500.
The state's Medicaid administrator placed a $382,500 lien
against Mr. Worker's award to recover those costs. Thus, we need to
recalculate what Mr. Worker will actually put in the bank:
a. Net recovery after litigation expenses $1,225,000
b. Minus Medicare lien ($382,500)
c. Net recovery after Medicaid lien $842,500
The $842,500 will make Mr. Worker independent for a time. If
he is wise he will invest that money, but consider that both the
consumer price index and the medical inflation index will also
increase during the subsequent years, likely offsetting investment
gains. Consider that after six years of litigation and a jury verdict he
is now forty-one years old and will need $55,000 per year for his
income loss ($40,000) and medical expenses ($15,000). In about
fifteen years, at age fifty-six, the money will be exhausted ($842,500
/ $55,000 per year = 15.3 years). Thus, he may have to go back on
Medicaid or Medicare and perhaps on welfare.
2 24
B. More About Medicare and Medicaid Liens
and Subrogated Claims
My example about the injured Mr. Worker is hypothetical, but in
a study of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Kinney et al.
reported anecdotal data bearing on the economic losses incurred by
some patients injured by medical malpractice. 225 A forty-three year-
old woman who lost function in her left arm and both legs and lost
both bladder and bowel control during an operation in 1981 was
consequently confined to a nursing home for the rest of her life. She
224. This hypothetical case does not consider other matters that would
complicate the financial picture. It is possible that due to the injury his life
expectancy will be shortened and his widow will inherit the money. The
example has also not considered any welfare payments to Mr. Worker and his
wife and children, or to debts for living expenses accrued during the five years
between the injury and the jury verdict. On the other hand, Mr. Worker's
health may deteriorate as a result of his injury and he may need nursing home
care, exponentially increasing his annual medical expenses.
225. Elanor Kinney, William Gronfein & Thomas Gannon, Indiana's
Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three Year Study, 24 IND. L. REv. 1275,
1276-77 (1991). Indiana's statute limits total recovery of all losses, economic
and non-economic, in medical malpractice cases to $750,000. Id.
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was eventually awarded an annuity of $400,000 in 1987.226 After
litigation expenses, lawyer fees, and Medicaid liens, the woman
reported that the remaining balance would not cover her nursing
home expenses for one year.
227
In research leading to Medical Malpractice and the American
Jury, I investigated a case involving a child suffering a brain injury
at birth who died two and a half years later. 228 The county paid for
his medical expenses during his brief life, approximately $900,000 in
today's dollars.22 9 Medicaid claimed all of that amount on behalf of
its taxpayers. 230 Recently in North Carolina a confidential source
described to me a medical malpractice case involving the death of an
elderly man and a settlement of about $350,000. Medicare took back
approximately $300,000.
In American law a health insurer is under statutory or
contractual obligation to pay the expenses of the person that it
insures if that person is ill. This obligation includes not only
government-sponsored plans such as Medicare and Medicaid but also
private health insurance plans, including HMOs and private
insurance like Blue Cross/Blue Shield. If a third party (a doctor in
the present context) is found to be responsible for the illness or
injury, the health insurer has a right to collect the money that it has
paid out for the insured patient subsequent to the negligent injury.
The basis of the law is built on reasoning that (a) if not for the
negligence of the third party the health insurer would not have had to
pay the bills and (b) it is not fair if the health insurer pays for the
injured person's medical expenses and the injured person then
collects and pockets the money for the same expenses.
In fact, the health insurer has the right to sue the doctor under
the patient's name. 231 The legal term "subrogation" is the right of
the insurer to "stand in the shoes" of the injured person. 232 A "lien"
226. Id. at 1301-02 n.169.
227. Id.
228. VIDMAR, supra note 3.
229. See id. at 28-29.
230. See id.
231. THOMAS J. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL, ERISA SUBROGATION 4
(2000); JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, HEALTH CARE BENEFITS LAW (2004);
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (2d Ed.) (2004) at 141.1
Subrogation Rights.
232. LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 231, at 4.
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against the award when the injured person sues involves the same
principle. Similar subrogation rights apply to income insurers like
workers' compensation and to a private employer that is
contractually obligated to pay a worker's salary during illness or
injury.
23 3
Both Medicare and Medicaid are administered by the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 234 Medicare covers persons
over age sixty-five and Medicaid generally provides for persons of
any age who are disabled or who have dependents and have no other
source to pay medical bills.235 Under the provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the administrators of
Medicare and Medicaid are required to assert subrogation rights and
collect any money they have paid for the patient if that patient
recovers money from a third party.
236
Herbert Kritzer examined the importance of claims against
recovery in a study of plaintiff lawyers in Wisconsin.237 Wisconsin
health insurers who pay for medical expenses of an injured person
are very aggressive in seeking to recoup their money from any
settlement or jury award paid by a negligent party.238 Kritzer found
that these third party claims occur in small cases as well as large
ones.2 39  Plaintiff lawyers often negotiate an agreement with the
public or private insurer to take only a percentage of the monies
owing in order to make it affordable for them and their clients to
undertake a lawsuit. 240 If the amounts of liens are too great, the
reduced potential recovery weighed against litigation time and
expenses may cause the lawyer to decline taking the case. This
insight provides an additional explanation for why injured patients
sometimes cannot find legal representation.
We do not have comprehensive data on the frequency and
magnitude of liens against medical malpractice verdicts and
settlements. Every state and the federal government have laws
233. See KRITZER, supra note 85, at 161-63.
234. See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/projects/APR/2004/facts.pdf.
235. Id.
236. ERISA, 404(a)(1); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1); see Liss v. Smith, 991 F.
Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
237. KRITZER, supra note 85, at 160-69.
238. Id. at 161.
239. Id.
240. See id.
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providing subrogation or other recovery rights for taxpayer-
supported health plans and private insurance plans, however.
24 1
Unquestionably, subrogated claims play a significant role in medical
malpractice litigation. In our John Worker case the lien was
relatively modest, but in many instances it may be substantially
greater, as in the two real life examples from Indiana and North
Carolina described above. Additionally, if Mr. Worker and his
family needed to take welfare assistance to pay their living expenses
or if the medical injury occurred while Mr. Worker was covered
under a workers' compensation scheme, those agencies might also
have liens against the money he received.
C. Public Policy Issue: Taxpayers as "Silent Plaintiffs"
In addition to the obvious points that prevailing plaintiffs may
have to surrender some of their net recovery to a public or private
health insurer and that lawyers cannot economically afford to take
cases with low potential recovery, a more subtle point is that
taxpayers indirectly have a stake in the medical malpractice outcome
through their financial underwriting of Medicaid, Medicare, and
other taxpayer-supported public welfare organizations. Only if Mr.
Worker and his lawyer file and win a lawsuit do the taxpayers get
their money back. The issue then is who should pay in these
instances, the negligent health care provider or taxpayers?
The hypothetical example of Mr. Worker has admittedly
simplified some issues. Kritzer, for example, found that third parties,
such as representatives of Medicaid, are sometimes very involved in
negotiations with the plaintiffs lawyer at early stages of lawsuits.
242
He pointed out that plaintiff lawyers frequently negotiate with public
and private health insurers in order to obtain agreements to take only
a percentage of the dollars they are due.
243
241. See generally, MAMORSKY, supra note 231 (describing these laws in
more detail).
242. See KRITZER, supra note 85, at 160-64.
243. Id. at 162-63. MAMORSKY, supra note 231, at 5-100-5-106 (reporting
that in some instances plaintiff lawyers have crafted settlement agreements
specifying that the payment is primarily for non-economic damages, greatly
reducing the amount that Medicaid or Medicare can recover when a statute
specifies that subrogation applies only to economic damages, but this tactic has
not always succeeded). In cases of extreme hardship, where recovery would
lead to especially harsh results, Medicaid and Medicare will sometimes waive
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The issue of subrogation has not been raised in the current
debate on tort reform, but it is an important public policy issue.
Specifically, taxpayers sometimes hold interests in common with
medical malpractice plaintiffs. Provocatively put, the issue is
whether taxpayers should assume the burden of medical negligence
or whether the negligent health care provider, through liability
insurance, should assume it.
XI. CAPS ON PAIN AND SUFFERING
The case of Mr. Worker draws attention to the consequences of
a cap of $250,000 on pain and suffering for plaintiffs. It suggests
that such caps will restrict the amount of recovery for injured
plaintiffs and may even affect their ability to find a lawyer to take
their case. Research studies of states with caps have tended to
confirm that caps reduce the amount recovered by plaintiffs,
244
but questions of fairness are raised. Research by Lucinda Finley
examined the consequences of caps on the allocation of plaintiff
recoveries in California, Florida, and Maryland by looking at jury
verdicts and calculating the discrepancy between what the jury
awarded and the amount the plaintiff would recover under caps.
245
She found that the major effects would fall most heavily on children,
women, and elderly people because their losses are more likely to be
non-economic losses, albeit often devastating and tragic.
246
David Studdert and his colleagues conducted a study of
California jury verdicts to assess the impact of California's $250,000
cap on non-economic damages and concluded as follows:
Analysis of proportional reductions shows that the burden
of caps tends to fall on injuries that cause chronic pain and
disfigurement but do not lead to declines in physical
functioning that would generate lost work time or high
health care costs.... Notwithstanding their limited
their right to recovery under the Medical Care Recovery Act. See KRITZER,
supra note 85, at 164.
244. See MARTIN D. WEISS, WEISS RATINGS, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CAPS: THE IMPACT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN
PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE 7-8
(2003), available at http://www.weissratings.com/malpracticecap.asp.
245. Finley, supra note 57.
246. Id. at 1265-66.
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economic impact, the injuries involved are by no means
trivial.247
Even if there is some unfairness, we need to consider if that is a
price to be paid if the effect of caps is to reduce doctors' liability
insurance premiums so that they can continue serving the public
health needs. This is a fair cost-benefit analysis, but the problem is
that research does not support the proposition that caps will reduce
those premiums. In a 2003 report the Government Accounting
Office concluded that there was no solid evidence to support the
proposition. 248 While some states with caps had lower premiums
than states without caps, some states without caps had premiums that
were lower than the capped states.24 9 A report by Weiss Ratings, a
respected insurance analyst, found that caps on pain and suffering
did not result in insurers reducing doctors' insurance premiums.
2 50
In 2003 GE Medical Protective Company, the nation's largest
medical malpractice insurer, reported to the Texas Department of
Insurance as follows: "Non-economic damages are a small
percentage of total losses paid. Capping non-economic damages will
show loss savings of 1.0%.,,251 The company also said that a
provision in Texas law allowing for periodic payments of awards
would provide a savings of only 1.1%. Medical Protective
eventually raised the rates on its physician policyholders.252 In
California, which has had a cap of $250,000 since 1975, GE Medical
Mutual sought an increase of 29.2% in liability insurance
premiums.253
In short, caps on pain and suffering do not appear to be the
answer to lowering doctors' liability insurance premiums.
247. David Studdert et al, supra note 221, at 63 (footnotes omitted); see also
Frank Sloan & C.R. Hsieh, Variabilty in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair? 24 LAW & SoC'y REv. 601 (1990) (pointing out a similar
inequity in pre-1990 cases).
248. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 5.
249. See id. at 37.
250. WEISS, supra note 244, at 3.
251. See http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/rp/rp004689.pdf.
252. THE NATION, October 26, 2004.
253. Id.
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XII. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND REMEDIES
In the introduction to this Essay I drew attention to its limited
focus on negligently injured patients, the contingency fee system,
and juries. There are many other issues in the controversy over
medical malpractice litigation, and they should not be minimized.
Once again, it is important to state that this Essay does not take issue
with the claim of the American Medical Association and other
parties urging "tort reform" that beginning about the year 2000 some
physicians began experiencing severe difficulties in obtaining
affordable medical liability insurance.
The issue then is what is the cause of the crisis, if not excessive
jury awards? Liability insurance companies claim that the frequency
of claims and the amounts that they have to pay for those claims and
the litigation expenses associated with defending them have
increased.254 Research by the National Center for State Courts found
that while there was a decline in medical malpractice case filings
from 1997 to 2000, filings increased in 2001 and 2002.255 This may
be a cause of present concerns of liability insurers since they have to
increase their financial reserves and anticipate greater total payouts
in three to six years as these cases mature and are settled. They will
also have to incur more transaction costs to defend the claims.
In contrast consumer groups and trial lawyers vehemently argue
that the cause of the present crisis is not the tort system.256 They
argue that in the first half of the 1990s competing insurance
companies irresponsibly underpriced liability premiums in a price
257war when bond markets yielded high returns on company reserves.
In 2000 when the financial investment markets were not so favorable
and insurers had to begin paying for the malpractice claims made in
the middle of the decade, they had to increase premiums to
254. See American Medical Association, supra note 5; see also
GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE, Florida, January 29, 2003 at 69-116 [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S
SELECT TASK FORCE], available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us.
255. Brian J. Ostrom et al., National Center for State Courts, Examining the
Work of State Courts, 2002, available at http://ncsonline.org.
256. See Ctr. for Justice & Democracy, Where's The Crisis? Has America
Been Duped By The AMA?, available at http://centerjd.org.
257. Studdert et al., supra note 3, at 286.
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compensate.2 58 There is evidence to support this claim.259 A recent
detailed study of the medical malpractice "liability crisis" in
Mississippi shows that in contrast to companies that invested their
reserves in the bond market, MACM, a doctor-owned mutual that is
Mississippi's largest medical liability insurer, invested a larger
percentage of its reserves in the stock market than most insurers.
260
MACM was hit particularly hard financially when the market turned
down at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
261
This Essay does not address other reforms that were
implemented or proposed, such as limiting plaintiff lawyer fees,
implementing pre-trial screening panels to weed out non-meritorious
cases, or changing "joint and several liability" rules in which a health
care provider who is judged to have only minor responsibility for an
injury nevertheless has to pay most or all of the damages caused by
another health care provider.262 Short but excellent reviews of most
of the medical malpractice issues are contained in two articles in the
New England Journal of Medicine and are highly recommended for
readers who seek more information on this topic.263 There also some
informative general books on the subject.264
XIII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Despite drawing attention to myths about the tort system,
reflective readers of this Essay will see that the American tort system
is very far from ideal. It involves considerable expense to both
patients and their lawyers, to malpractice liability insurers, and
ultimately to health care providers through insurance premiums.
Many dollars are devoted to transaction costs, not only by injured
patients but by liability insurers who cumulatively spend millions of
258. Thomas Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting
Cycle, 52 DEPAUL L. REv.393 (forthcoming 2005).
259. See id.; Studdert et al., supra note 3; Jay Anghof, Challenging the Need
for Medical Mutual's Malpractice Rate Increase, TRIAL REPORTER 8 (Winter
2004).
260. Percy, supra note 209, at 1060-65.
261. Id. at 1063-65.
262. See Studdert et al., supra note 3, for a brief discussion of tort reforms in
this context.
263. Id.
264. E.g., IRA WILLIAMS, FIRST, DO NO HARM: THE CURE FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (2004).
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dollars defending non-meritorious claims and claims where liability
may be clear but agreement cannot be reached on the amount of
damages. Many negligently injured patients receive no
compensation. There is evidence that patients with relatively less
serious injuries who do make claims are overcompensated while
patients with more serious injuries are undercompensated for their
losses.
Being sued and even the prospect of being sued causes health
care providers much emotional anguish. 265 There are arguments that
the threat of lawsuits causes doctors to engage in defensive medicine,
ordering unnecessary tests and other procedures that drive up the
costs of health care. There appears to be equivocal evidence to
support the defensive medicine argument, and the counter argument
has been made that some defensive medicine is good, such as helping
to ensure that doctors order tests that may detect problems at early
stages of a disease rather than in later stages. 266 On the other hand,
there is no solid evidence that the tort system actually deters
negligent medical treatment. 267 In fact deterrence is a difficult
phenomenon to prove. David Hyman and Charles Silver have
provided a detailed and insightful analysis of the relationship
between the tort system and the quality of health care268 that is too
lengthy to discuss here but is recommended for interested readers.
If the tort system were abolished for medical malpractice there
would be no problem with doctors and hospitals obtaining affordable
liability insurance-they would not need any professional liability
insurance. However, an alternative system would be needed to cover
the medical and income losses of patients who are injured when
undergoing medical treatment. Some authors proposed a "no-fault"
system in which injured patients would be compensated under a
system like workers' compensation plans, but those schemes have
raised issues regarding enormous costs to taxpayers and have been
265. GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE, supra note 254, at 79-102.
266. See Michelle Mello & Troyen Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory And Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1595 (2002)
(reviewing these issues).
267. Id.
268. David Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality
in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the
Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
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proven to be politically not viable. 269  If the United States had
universal health care coverage, some of the problems of economic
losses incurred by patients following medical negligence would be
relieved, because medical costs, if not income losses, would be
covered. Universal health care, too, has also proven politically not
viable.
Beginning about 1982, with on pressure from Congress,
Medicare payments for health care provider services have been
increasingly tightened. 270 HMO restrictions on payments also affect
physician incomes. In discussions with physicians, I found they
complain of increasing pressures on the way they practice medicine
and the impact of these pressures on their incomes. This issue is also
ignored in the malpractice debate, but it may well be an important
contributor to physician reactions to the problems of the affordability
of liability insurance.
Medical malpractice and medical malpractice litigation are
complicated subjects, but public debate has often involved
misunderstandings, particularly with respect to negligently injured
patients and the judge and jury system. This Essay has presented
information intended to correct some of those misunderstandings and
raise an additional issue about who should bear the cost of medical
negligence. But the reader must bear in mind that it is selective and
does not cover all of the many issues. Medical malpractice litigation
is a complex problem for which simple answers are insufficient and
which, in any event, involves some tough value choices!
269. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposed Remedy for Mississippi's Medical
Malpractice Miniseries, 22 MIss. C. L. REv. 1 (2002); Paul Weiler, The Case
for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908 (1993).
270. See http://research.aarp.org/health/fs45r-medicare.html; http://www.
medpac.gov/publications/congressionaltestimony/072302(WM)local-input_p
rices.pdf, http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressionalreports/Mar04_
TableContents.pdf.
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